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micro interpersonal dynamics that create systemic advantages for some employees and 
disadvantages for others.  We predict that the next generation of race discrimination 
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ss passed the 
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at there is a 
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2002),  and that we are experiencing what some employment law theorists refer to as 
the term “second 
generation” invites us to imagine a sharp divide or discontinuity between employment 
discrimination today and employment discrimination in the aftermath of Jim Crow, one 
can question its descriptive and historical accuracy. But if one understands “second 
generation” to be about salience and context—namely, that the salience of and the 
context in which racial discrimination occurs today differs from the Jim Crow era—the 
                                                
 
 
What forms of discrimination are likely to be salient in the coming decade
flags a cluster of problems that roughly fall under the rubric of inclusive
discrimination by inclusion. Much contemporary discrimination theory a
work is concerned not simply with mapping the forces that keep p
market but also with identifying the forces that push them into hierarchi
within workplaces and labor markets. Underwriting this effort is the notion
determining precisely what happens before and during the moment in whi
prospective employee is excluded from an employment opportunity remai
anti-discrimination theory and practice, significant employment discrim
can occur after a person  is hired and becomes an employee. These prob
racial and sexual harass
olarship will engage these  “after inclusion”workplace difficulties—theo
empirically and doctrinally. .  
 
I. Introduction 
Employment discrimination today is not what it was when Congre
il Rights Act of 1964.  There are a number of ways to articulate this 
emphasize the shift from explicit animus to implicit bias. (Kang 2005) Othe
language of de jure and de facto discrimination to characterize the difference
1960s and the present. (Harris 2005) Still others ground their comp
distinction between conscious or purposeful discrimination, on the on
unconscious or accidental discrimination, on the other. (Krieger 1995; Lawr
Notwithstanding the competing rhetorical registers in which scholar
differences between discrimination then and now, there is consensus th
difference, that much of contemporary discrimination has gone underg
“second generation” discrimination. (Sturm 2001) To the extent 
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term has purchase.  Consider conscious racial animus. While a claim that
discrimination has disappeared would be difficult to sustain, most wou
conscious racial animus is not as prevalent a social practice as it once was and is no
salient. Moreover, because of shifts in our legal and social norms about
context in which racial animus is practiced and experienced transcends the d
and includes the ladder of advancement. In this respect, the challenge of em
is to respond not just to new forms of discrimination (be they structural, p
cultural or inter-personal) but to the fact that different forms of d
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While access is important, the story of discrimination does not end at the moment 
of access.  Inclusion in does not mean the absence of discrimination from. Under certain 
conditions, an employer’s desire to grant access coexists with discriminatory policies and 
practices.  Put another way, access can both reflect and facilitate discrimination. Below 
we explain how this is so in the context of assessing recent trends in discrimination 
theory, empirical work, and litigation.  Our focus is on racial discrimination, but race 
discrimination is often not separable from discrimination based on other aspects of 
 of salience, and become particularly “sticky” in different employment 
function of the historical backdrop within which the discrimination occurs.  
Which brings us to the central question this Essay engages: How
context is discrimination imagined to occur today and what forms of disc
likely to be salient in the coming decade?  We focus on a cluster of prob
situate under the rubric of inclusive exclusions or discrimination by inc
contemporary discrimination theory and empirical work is concerned not sim
forces that keep people out of the labor market but also with forces that p
hierarchical structures within workplaces and labor markets. Put anothe
determining precisely what happens
spective employee is excluded from an employment opportunity remains crucial to 
anti-discrimination theory and practice, employment scholars are beginning
attention to what happens to that person after she is hired and becomes 
What happens, in other words, after inclusion?  
Scholars across disciplines have noted the ways in which i
marginalization often go hand in hand. Think of the widespread claim th
second class citizens within the legal profession. Part of what underwrites 
is the empirical fact that while law firms include blacks as associates (i.e., a
workers) they exclude them in sign
ers). (Wilkins 1998, 2007; Conley 2006) Or consider the problem of workplace 
ghettoization: women are included in academia and the professions but excl
ghettoized in) certain areas of specialization. (Schultz 1990) In both examp
precedes and creates a condition of possibility for exclusion, thus our notio
exclusions or discrimination by inclusion.  
Discrimination by inclusion should b
rimination, that is, models of discrimination within which exclusion and
mutually exclusive and oppositional social dynamics. Central to exclusion
discrimination are three core ideas: (1) that discrimination functions to ke
by closing the doors of access, (2) that doors in the labor market remain clo
people, and (3) that judges should employ anti-discrimination law as a 
mechanism—that is, as a vehicle to facilitate access.  
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identity, such as gender, class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.  (Crensh
structure our discussion around the following eight themes: (1) preferential
intellectual capital; (3) legal endogeneity and the behavior of compliance p
(4) incomplete consciousness; (5) performance and assimilation; 
aw 1993) We 
 inclusion; (2) 
rofessionals; 
(6) rational 
discrimination and accommodation; (7) intra-racial discrimination; and (8) racial 
  
II.  Inclusive Exclusion or Discrimination by Inclusion 
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Another form of preferential inclusion is word-of-mouth hiring practices. They 
tend to produce ethnically or linguistically homogenous work forces. An example is an 
immigrant-run business that favors immigrant workers and employs word-of-mouth 
hiring to effectuate that preference. Does this practice provide employment opportunities 
for a group who might otherwise have difficulty finding jobs, or does it discriminate 
against other groups? The proliferation of nail salons in many U.S. cities brings this 
question into sharp relief. To a considerable extent, these salons are ethnic enclaves 
endogeneity.  
Preferential Inclusion 
 
Historically, exclusion constituted the quintessential form of discrim
this might still be true today. But per se exclusion does not exhaust how d
operates. Discrimination can still occur after or at the moment of inc
scholars employ this very observation to challenge the legitimacy of affirm
policies. For these scholars, affirmative action increases the representa
minorities by including them on unfair terms. This understanding of affir
explains why various  forms of social inclus
reach efforts) are referred to as “racial preferences.”   (Sander 2006, 200
do not view affirmative action in this way, the “racial preference” character
policy illustrates that the notion that inclusion can facilitate or be pre
preferences already has social traction.  
Preferential inclusion, or instances in which an employer prefers o
over another based on problematic terms, occurs in many forms, some o
directly linked to assumptions about the kind of worker the employee is like
inclusion. Consider the relationship between preferential inclusion an
segmentation of occupations.  Imagine an employer who wants a workforce
uncomplaining employees who have a strong work ethic and are unlikely
rigorous compliance with workplace laws.  Such an employer might prefer
Latino/a immigrants, especially those who have an ingrained fear of the
authorities. (Rodriguez 2007)  The employer prefers not to hire whit
American employees because he believes that they have a higher likeliho
trouble, agitating for better conditions, and filing legal charges. T
usion is based on expectations about the ways in which Latinas/os will n
relationship to hierarchy and authority within the workplace after they are 
these preferred Latino/a employees have a claim against the employer on th
the employer’s preference for them was based on problematic racial stereot
terms upon which the Latino/a workers included illegally discriminatory,
they appear to have been beneficiaries rather than victims of stereotype discr
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dominated by recent Vietnamese immigrants.  Is this affirmative action for 
discrimination against others? Courts have generally rejected challenges
mouth hiring, notwithstanding that this practice produces ethnically 
workforces. (Cao 2003)  One question is whether there will be a shift in 
approach, particularly against a backdrop of empirical studies based on ce
suggest that racial and ethnic discrimination at the workplace level is per
studies indicate that ethnic discrimination is especially acute among white
workers, that there was no decline in racial and ethnic workplace segrega
1990 and 2000 (Hernandez 2007)
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 Halley 2006) 
that the story 
rimination by 
inclusion, preferential inclusion being just one of them.  (Carbado 2005; Agamben 1998) 
Now that scholars, lawyers and judges understand discrimination to include 
norms and practices that define the terms on which racial or ethnic groups are included in 
the workplace, the ambit of legally relevant behavior has expanded.  No longer is the 
question solely whether particular policies close the doors to employment opportunities. 
The ways in which doors to employment are opened can themselves facilitate 
discrimination and will be a central area of study.  We can no longer afford to think about 
unchanged over the decade, black-white segregation increased by abou
(Hellerstein, Neumark & McInerney 2007).   
Preferential inclusion can occur not only based on perceived race o
also based on perceived behaviors. Sexual harassment presents a case in po
MacKinnon is credited with pioneering work establishing that a supervisor
enforced demand that an employee submit to sexual overtures as a conditio
promotion is illegal sex discrimination.  (MacKinnon 1979) But more su
preference based on pliability remain of uncertain legal status.  A manager
in sexual banter with his attractive female employees and rewards those
favorably with promotions, pay bonuses, mentorship and training discrim
those employees who do not wish to participate in the manager’s workplace 
The unconsenting employees are left alone; they are forced to endure no sex
neither do they receive mentoring or the supervisory attention that enhances
for promotion.  It is unclear whether they can bring a sex discrimination 
being included within the ambit of a sexually charged set of interactio
discrimination because it denies them, among other things, the benefits of m
the manager’s preference for women who are willing go along with h
behavior a form of preferential inclusion?  
One of the ways in which human resource departments have resp
nexus between a sexualized workplace and sex discrimination law is to disf
fraternizing that might lead to sexual harassment liability—such  as so
dinner and drinks with subordinates of the opposite sex. If the effect of thi
is to deny young female employees the opportunity to mingle informally w
supervisors, it is unclear whether the women’s equal employment opportu
anced or harmed by the policy. (Thomas 1990). This helps explain why s
scholars have begun to argue that sexually sanitizing the workplace is not 
and often obfuscates gender inequality within the workplace. (Schultz 2003;
This line of work is consistent with the broader point this Essay advances: 
of discrimination does not end with inclusion; there are many forms of disc
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access in terms of whether people are getting in, we have to continue to think critically 
and carefully about how they are getting in and what happens when they do.   
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differences in 
educational attainment to cultural attitudes toward education.  Proponents of this view 
argue that efforts to equalize the funding differential between white and nonwhite schools 
should be redirected at culturally transforming the way in which black families, for 
example, view education—in other words, towards altering perceptions and incentives in 
a manner that results in greater investment in education in the poorer sections of the black 
community.  Even liberals articulate some variant of this argument. Thus, while Barack 
Obama, for example, would not jettison the project of equalizing funding for blacks 
Intellectual Capital 
 
Inequality in intellectual capital is today one of the principal con
discrimination studies.  Formal education and technical skill are perhaps m
today than at any time in American history. (Stone 2006; Fisk 2005) With 
American manufacturing and the decline of union density in jobs requirin
college education, real wages for workers with only a high school educatio
fallen, whereas real wages for the highly educated have increased.  (Rosé
2005)  Many scholars and policy makers argue that differences in educa
provide at least a partial explanation for the growing gap between rich an
United States and globally, for the under-representation of certain races in s
their over-representation in others, and for a variety of other inequalities i
of incarceration, family structure, and health.  They also contribute to st
levels of job satisfaction, employment security, pay, and the availabil
bility, and retirement insurance.  More generally, some of the standard
well-being are linked to levels of educational attainment.   The pattern of inclusion a
exclusion of racial groups in the workplace is thus linked to inequalities 
capital. 
 Yet education today is unequal, particularly with respect to race. M
years after Brown v. Board of Education declared de jure race segregati
education unconstitutional, primary and secondary education remains racial
(Clotfelter 2004; Parker 2003, 2001). As in the pre-Brown era, non-white
significantly under-resourced in comparison to their white counterparts 
offer an inferior education.  Efforts of school districts and universi
enrollment plans to ensure integration have been invalidated by the Sup
(Siegel 2007). And legal challenges to unequal resources are difficult to mo
met with only limited success. (Koski 2007).  To some extent, lawyers t
more difficult doctrinal position arguing for racial equality in the context
than their pre-Brown counterparts. They can ar
urces. Pre-Brown, the latter argument was constitutionally cogniza
2002). Although minorities are no longer formally excluded from equa
opportunity and are, in theory, entitled to equal expenditures on educatio
equality of access to education masks inequality in the terms on which minority s
are included in educational institutions.  What remain are schools that
segregated and non-white schools that are under-funded.   
Against this backdrop, a narrative has emerged that attributes racial 
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schools, he is also clear that at least part of the black community is in need
reconstruction—and that many in the black community recognize this. 
Obama, “go into any inner city neighborhood, and folks will tell you tha
alone can't teach kids to learn.  They know that parents have to parent, that 
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inequalities in education (among other places) is the widespread skepticism about 
whether the law should be explicitly redistributivist.  Still another explanation has to do 
with merit—namely, that affirmative action-like policies are preferences that undermine 
merit and unfairly burden and/or discriminate in the reverse against whites (and Asian 
Americans).  (Harris & Narayan 1994; Crenshaw 2007). 
This last argument about merit and reverse discrimination occupies much space in 
contemporary debates. As the value of elite education and technical job skills rises and 
ieve unless we raise their expectations and turn off the television sets 
the slander that says a black youth with a book is acting white.” (Obama 200
As access to knowledge and intellectual capital becomes more important in the 
postindustrial workplace, questions about the relationship between racial 
employment and educational inequality also become more salient.  Race
segregation at the workplace tends to be self-perpetuating, and racial m
women of all races are over-represented in lower-paying jobs and at 
economic periphery where they face greater risk of layoffs during econom
(Reskin, McBrer & Kmec 1999).  The task of identifying the causes of raci
segmentation in labor markets and its relationship to inequality is comp
Bielby 1980), but it is clear that both discrimination by and within firms an
in the attainment of skills and knowledge play a role.  Scholars have 
understand what part of the under-representation of blacks in elite labor 
professions, business, and academia—is attributable to differences in educa
and what part is attributable to bias.  As with investments in schooling, on
whether part of the story has to do with inadequate investments by black 
firm-specific capital, which then results in inadequate investment in them b
end result of which would be a lower success rate for even those blacks wh
inclusion within firms.  Perceptions of discrimination may provide one ex
e lower investment levels. Thus far, there has been little research on
Even when scholars agree that historical and contemporary discrimination p
partial role in explaining the differences in educational attainment across 
they often disagree about whether employers should—or even can
affirmative action programs to correct for that discrimination.  
Even as social scientists have shown the pervasiveness of racial s
education and work and the dire consequences for workforce equalit
integration, some judges and some legal scholars are less optimistic than th
were about the power of courts to equalize societal differences (Tushnet 
there is controversy over the very idea that law should or can addr
inequalities in education, intellectual capital, and health or pervasive racial s
housing, education, or occupations.  Part of the controversy has to do with t
individual agency and responsibility on the part of (especially) blacks could
change the level of black peoples’ education
ion is that blacks need to change themselves and positive educational 
follow. Another explanation for the fact that law is less available today to elim
5/29/2008 
competition to attain them intensifies, affirmative action policies are
vulnerable to the critique that they are unfair because they instantiate p
candidates with less intellectual capital.  Already, the legal debate is less a
employers discriminate against people of color with lower levels of form
attainment by failing to examine their hiring or promotion criteria rigor
whether they needlessly cause a disparate impact (as was supposed in the
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.) and more about whether employers dis
attempting to do so. (Sander 2006; Coleman & Gulati 2006)  Yet, while co
race-based affirmative action is wavering, there remains concern about 
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hav employers to 
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 thinking has 
intuitive appeal: diversity training makes employees more aware of the multiple forms 
employment discrimination can take; and this awareness reduces the likelihood that the 
employees will engage in behavior that a legal decision-maker would conclude is 
discriminatory.   
But compliance professionals do more than “norm” workplace behavior; they also 
“norm” anti-discrimination law itself. To the extent there is adoption of the procedures 
compliance professionals prescribe, it is possible that courts and other regulators will 
ial policies that allow intergenerational upw
ation appears to be easier for elites.  (Malamc
 
Legal Endogeneity and Compliance Professionals 
 
Part of managing a firm entails translating and operationalizing
including anti-discrimination regimes. Managers have to understand w
commands and then institutionalize that understanding into concrete workpl
This is no easy task. Legal prescriptions are often both unclear and 
Certainly this is true of anti-discrimination law. When does a racial joke c
and create a hostile environment? What kind of affirmative actions progra
Under what circumstances does a facially neutral employment policy (e.g
hire persons without a high school diploma or with any criminal record) ca
disparate racial or gendered impact? An industry of compliance prof
emerged to help firms make sense of the foregoing questions, among 
surprisingly, empirical research on discrimination attempts to understand 
significance of compliance professionals in shapin
itutional behaviors. 
Compliance professionals translate vague legal prescriptions specific in
protocols. In this sense, compliance professionals are legal agents. They 
determine how an institution negotiates its relationship to anti-discrim
(Edelman, Uggen & Erlanger 1999; Dobbin & Kalev 2007, 2006)   
The now-ubiquitous practice of diversity training has become an im
managing the problem of workplace discrimination. Much, though certain
this training focuses on employment discrimination issues that arise after
particular, compliance professionals have played a crucial role in helpin
address issue
e done so is diversity training.  Compliance professionals encourage 
utilize diversity training as an institutional mechanism to reduce the risk of d
law suits and increase the likelihood of successfully defending them. The
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internalize these prescriptions. The prescriptions become formally folded 
To continue with the diversity training example, a judge or jury might
presence of absence of diversity training as relevant to the question of
employer created a hostile work environment.  Understood this way
professionals are legal agents not only in the sense of interpreting the law b
of shaping the content of law. Pointedly, compliance professionals const
laws they pu
into the law.  
 point to the 
 whether the 
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itute the very 
rport to institutionalize. Law is endogenous to and not simply constitutive of 
thei , Edelman & 
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Incomplete Consciousness 
 
The four decades’ worth of legal and social science scholarship since the federal 
prohibition of employment discrimination has established that simply outlawing the 
exclusion of minorities was not enough to ensure that minorities were included in 
numbers equal to their representation in the relevant labor market.  In trying to determine 
why minorities are still underrepresented, scholars have focused particularly on the legal 
r prescriptions.  (Edelman 2005, Edelman, Fuller & Mara Drita 2001
Suchman 1999) 
The endogeneity of anti-discrimination mandates is especially li
where regulation is difficult. Under such circumstances, the regulators have
to allow the regulated to devise and implement the legal regimes und
regulated will operate their businesses. In this way, the regulated become s
which increases the likelihood that they will window-dress rather than
institut
et worse as the industry of compliance professionals grows in size and i
larger and more influential this industry, the more it is likely to push its own
agendas.   
   Even in the absence of this endogeneity problem, there is an empi
about the efficacy of compliance professionals’ prescriptions. Scholars are
question whether compliance professionals help or hinder the el
discriminati
surprise us: The compliance professional industry seems to be benefitin
professionals more than potential victims of discrimination. Put another 
diversity training is big business, but it is not clear that it helps the potent
discrimination. 
This raises a more general question about the efficacy of reform effo
of employers to eliminate racism from the workplace.  While legal schola
to try systematically to assess the effects of litigation and institutional refo
eliminating overt and subconscious discrimination, a host of questions re
2003; Hart 2005; Levit 2008)  For example, what deterrent effect might be
the threat of large damage and
availability of employm
 study of anti-discrimination mandates in the next generation will b
intertwined with the study of the compliance industry, an industry that, b
investment in litigation and liability avoidance, is fundamentally concern
happens to employees after inclusion.    
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doctrine requiring that plaintiffs prove an adverse employment action was
discriminatory intent.  The law’s emphasis on the motive of the employer –
the harm to the victim – has been termed a “perpetrator perspective”; the m
legal decision-makers to look for a bad person who acted consciously and in
bring about some discriminatory result. (Freeman 1990). The requiremen
discriminatory intent has become a substantial obstacle for many plaintiffs
today admit even 
 motivated by 
 as opposed to 
odel requires 
tentionally to 
t of proving 
 because few 
privately to harboring bias, and virtually no one admits to acting on it.  
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 scholars who 
scientifically 
nscious racial 
way that law 
ic is being fought in the pages of law reviews, in 
which some scholars argue that social science evidence shows that unconscious and 
subconscious bias are pervasive and their pervasiveness justifies legal rules to remedy 
that bias (Kang & Banaji 2006) and other scholars argue that the evidence of a 
connection between unconscious bias and discriminatory conduct is weak or nonexistent. 
(Mitchell & Tetlock 2006). The difficult methodological problem is to link evidence of 
pervasive bias drawn from the IAT and other types of psychological tests with evidence 
of pervasive racial inequality in employment.   
 surprisingly, in today’s labor market, every employer insists that i
opportunity employer.  
 The legal requirements of proof of intent have generated doctrinal 
complexity.  (Sullivan 2005; Zimmer 2004; Malamud 1994)  Over the past
the federal courts have ruled on a variety of evidentiary issues, such as:  if
made a racist remark but did so in a context other than in acting on a decis
plaintiff’s employment, is that remark evidence of bias or is it an irre
remark”?  Must a plaintiff adduce “direct” evidence of discriminatory
circumstantial evidence sufficient? Is testimony by other employees ab
discriminatory events that are similar to what the plaintiff alleged she
relevant?  Must a plaintiff who was passed over for promotion prove that th
was promoted was less or equally qualified?  As one doctrinal conflict is s
one arises.   
Apart from the doctrinal complexity, critics also assail the inten
consequentialist grounds: there is pervasive racial inequality at work yet no
to blame for it except, possibly, the victims themselves. Frustrated wi
utes over structures of proving discriminatory intent which, plain
believe, make it unduly difficult to prove a case, many legal scholars and so
began to question the focus on intent vel non.  What if discrimination is t
subconscious or unconscious biases, biases beyond our conscious awarene
1995; Oppenheimer 1993) 
The notion of unconscious or negligent discrimination raises thor
First, how do we know whether unconscious discrimination is a real 
Second, assuming that people do have unconscious racial desires or thou
identify them? To answer these two questions, social psychologists have d
Implicit Association Test (IAT), which measures reaction times to subtle r
(Lane, Kang & Banaji 2007). Their work has attracted the attention of legal
employ it to argue that unconscious or subconscious discrimination is 
verifiable. (Kang & Banaji 2006). If the IAT does indeed measure unco
thinking, a third question arises:  does such thinking affect conduct in a 
should recognize? A battle on this top
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An equally difficult legal problem is choosing a standard for proving
between unequal outcomes in the absence of evidence of overt bias and a
range of remedial measures. Should firms not hire people whose implicit b
certain threshold? Should the law require firms to measure the cumulative im
their workplaces as a way to ascertain whether an environment is rac
Already scholars have begun to engage the issue of de-biasing—that is, whe
be taken to remove or decrease our level of implicit bias (Bielby 2007; Jol
2006).  Should the law mandate that employers subject their employees t
agents,” in addition to or in lieu of the usual diversity training programs? (K
2006).  For example, if having a black manager reduces one’s level of 
should that (rather than diversity) constitute a sufficient legal justification fo
race-based affirmative action in appointing managers? Finally, what
 a connection 
n appropriate 
ias is above a 
plicit bias of 
ially hostile?  
ther steps can 
ls & Sunstein 
o “de-biasing 
ang & Banaji 
implicit bias, 
r engaging in 
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Title VII, an 
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thro  women and 
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are in a better 
planations for 
titude or was 
 race neutral 
w when the 
employer’s facially race neutral claim that an employee has a poor attitude is racially 
infused?  Consider this problem in the context of gender. When an accounting firm 
passed over a successful female partnership candidate on the grounds that she was too 
abrasive, the Supreme Court majority in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins could perceive the 
explanation as being possibly discriminatory because among the explanations partners 
gave for their decision was the advice that she should “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear 
 minority employees could take to reduce implicit bias?  If assimilation
norms reduces implicit bias, may firms require minorities to assimilate, as,
by requiring black women to straighten their hair or by hiring only those wh
The difficulty of determining an appropriate standard of proof
structure to deal with the problem of implicit bias relates to larger qu
whether litigation is the right regulatory vehicle through which to combat
Perhaps an ex ante regulatory solution (e.g
es via psychological testing) might work better than an ex post litiga
Perhaps the optimal schema would be one that entails an anti-discriminatio
process to determine whether the firm has the appropriate protections in p
that discrimination in that workplace is minimized.     
The recent literature on implicit bias invites renewed attention to a
literature on the circumstances in which law prohibits practices that are ne
face but have a discriminatory impact.  (Sullivan 2005).  Charles Lawrenc
question in the context of constitutional law, arguing that when a law dispar
a non-white group it should be unconstitutional if that disparate impac
entrenches negative social or cultural meanings about that non-white grou
1987).  If his “cultural meaning” test were employed in the context of 
economically rational neutral employment practice 
ugh word of mouth such that table staff were predominantly Anglo
busboys were predominantly Latino men -- would be illegal if it fostered n
stereotypes. If implicit bias exists as a kind of background norm, maybe we 
evidentiary and conceptual position to ascertain whether facially neutral ex
an adverse employment action – such as that the plaintiff had a poor at
difficult to get along with – are in fact evidence of racial bias.   
Doctrinally, the challenge would be to distinguish the legitimate
explanations from the illegitimate ones. In other words, how do we kno
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jewelry.” (490 U.S. 228, 235)  Absent the comments about her appearanc
courts identify bias in comments about “abrasiveness”? In part because of 
the 1980s witnessed a pointed contestation about whether disparate impact 
dominant framework for adjudicating discrimination claims.  Lawrence’s p
were based on Freudian notions (a
e, how should 
this difficulty, 
should be the 
roposals that 
nd a prior generation of research) are now being 
rev  the IAT test 
ious racism is 
n claims be 
loyer is in the 
 (or hold the 
er did not intend.  Should law focus on whether 
an i urn on intent? 
perienced a 
 unconscious 
y outcomes.  
regated invites continued 
scholarly attention to the question. Incomplete consciousness looks to be a prime 
candidate to explain the persistence of inequality in the absence of evidence of the sort of 
that existed half a century ago, but studying the phenomenon and designing 
lega
ecause of the 
ion that black 
ssimilate into 
s,” (Robinson 
discussions of 
es who might 
o mainstream 
levant to the 
rity of some 
 thought to be 
scrimination was deemed to be a 
reac  Irish, Italian, 
tieth century 
assimilated into American culture and jettisoned the ways of the “old world,” they would 
ascend the social and economic hierarchy, join elite social groups, and lose their outsider 
status.  The idea that various immigrant groups could assimilate rendered institutional 
exclusion passé and offered an optimistic story that all forms of discrimination—
particularly racial discrimination—could be transcended over time. 
The immigrant assimilation story has not gone unchallenged. The literature on 
white ethnics—and particularly Jewish and Irish people—demonstrates the way in which 
isited in the context of the recent empirical research such as that on
(Connecticut Law Review Symposium 2007). 
 A final question has to do with legitimacy.  Assuming that unconsc
real and can be doctrinally managed, should unconscious discriminatio
cognizable?  If discrimination is inadvertent, then it is not clear that the emp
best position to prevent it.  Scholars debate whether law should “punish”
employer liable for) something the manag
nstitutional decision-maker did something “wrong,” and does “wrong” t
Or should law focus on whether an employee or a prospective employee ex
recognizable harm?  (Bagenstos 2003; Jolls 2001). 
 There is no consensus on the question of whether subconscious and
discrimination play a meaningful role in producing discriminator
Nevertheless, the fact that employment remains racially seg
overt bias 
l rules to address it remain vexing empirical and theoretical problems.  
 
Performance and Assimilation  
  
Ordinarily we do not think of race in terms of assimilation, in part b
claim that that one’s capacity to assimilate is itself racialized. Thus the not
people, because they are (physically marked as) black cannot fully a
mainstream society.  Because of the currency of this “impossibility thesi
2001; Inniss 1999; Jaynes & Williams 1989; Haley & Malcolm X 1965) 
assimilation tend to be class-oriented.  As blacks and other racial minoriti
have once been subject to the impossibility thesis are being included int
working environments, however, the assimilation question is becoming re
operation of contemporary race discrimination.      
After the decline of public discussion of the alleged racial inferio
European immigrant groups, discrimination against immigrants was rarely
about immigrant status per se. More frequently, this di
tion to perceived lower-class behavior. The thinking was that once the
Jewish, Eastern and Southern European immigrants of the early twen
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racism can actually facilitate assimilation.  Both the Irish and the Jews 
because of the existence (not the absence) of racism. (Ignatiev 1995; Brodk
literature on Latina/o assimilation also helps to reveal the nexus between as
racism. (Golash-Boza 2006; Johnson 1997) Scholars are asking, among ot
whether Latino/a integration in American society is more like that of ethnic 
of African Americans? Asked another way, are Latinos/as having an ethnic
the United States or a racial one? (Rodriguez 2006; Haney López 1997)
political debates about bi-lingualism and English-only initiatives are about 
assimilation. (Matsuda 1991; Rodriguez 2006) What unites the literature
assimilation is its focus on the many ways in which institutions subtly and o
difficult for immigrants to thrive or succeed, whether through rules abo
religious practice, appearance, conformity to customer preferences, or fam
unspoken norms about professionalism, social interaction, or business p
became white 
in 1998) The 
similation and 
her questions, 
whites or that 
 experience in 
. The heated 
both race and 
 on Latina/o 
vertly make it 
ut language, 
iliarity with 
ractice.  The 
cen  be forced to 
er to fit into 
López 1996).  
his point is to 
t Latinas/os are conceptualized in this 
way .  Part of the 
ects: that they 
upy all racial 
that does not 
e in a better 
m a static or 
ss American 
cts of 
ke the form of 
pastimes.  A 
ssure is racial. Scholars 
hav black women 
7) Even those 
whether anti-
 policies that 
tualizing race 
performative identity conflate race with ethnicity and/or national origin?  
ize blackness 
 regardless of 
eived as being 
“more” or “less” black based on their skin color, hair, or facial structure, or their class 
status, accent, manner of dress or deportment.  If race is an expressive identity that can be 
constituted by language, accent, demeanor, or dress, where does race end and ethnicity 
begin? 
As racial minorities are being included in mainstream workplaces as nominal 
equals (as opposed to as invisible support staff), they are simultaneously also being asked 
to assimilate.  This assimilatory demand creates an incentive for employees to play with 
tral normative question this literature presents is whether people should
give up some aspect of their identity—for, example, language—in ord
mainstream American society and its institutions.  (Rodriguez 2006; Haney 
The issue of “fit” is directly applicable to race.  One way to make t
focus on Latinas/os as a racial group. To extent tha
, the pressures they experience to fit in are necessarily racial pressures
difficulty with this argument is the racial assumption about Latinas/os it refl
are a single racial group.  It may be more accurate to say that Latinas/os occ
categories—white, mestizo, black, Indian, etc. (Rivera 2007)   
There is another way to make the argument about “fit” and race 
depend on conceptualizing Latinas/os as a single racial group.  We ar
conceptual position to understand this argument once we move away fro
phenotypic understanding of race to a performative understanding. Acro
workplaces, employees are being asked—explicitly and implicitly—to shape aspe
their identity to fit into a dominant workplace culture.  Assimilation may ta
changing one’s appearance, attending to diction, or adopting particular 
lively debate addresses the question whether assimilationist pre
e debated, for example, whether it is racial discrimination to prohibit 
from wearing their hair in braids. (Caldwell 1991; Rosette 2007; Flagg 200
who see pressure to assimilate as a form of race discrimination debate 
discrimination law is the best doctrinal method to challenge employment
demand assimilation.  (Fisk 2006; Selmi 2006)  More broadly, does concep
as a 
The dominant anti-discrimination approach has been to conceptual
as a fixed and static racial category.  To be black was simply to be black,
the way in which some persons of African or Caribbean ancestry were perc
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their racial identity—to push and pull it at the margins—in non-phenotyp
implications of this racial flexibility for anti-discrimination law will be 
question employment discrimination scholars will be forced to eng
fundamentally, scholars are beginning to think about how to articulate whe
of race begin an
ic terms. The 
precisely the 
age.  More 
re the borders 
d where race shades into class, ethnicity, and sexual orientation (none of 
cept sometimes ethnicity – is currently a protected status under federal anti-
disc
  
mination and 
employer to 
ieves will not 
ost forms of 
ld artificially 
stances, it is 
possessing or 
netic or other 
th physical or 
be barriers to 
ught not (the 
imarily in the 
m of rational 
accommodate 
that if, after 
ned the workplace to eliminate barriers to one worker’s 
bein  to contribute 
t of particular 
condition.  A 
s a kind of 
s of disability 
ed, eliminate 
agined.  An 
tion was not 
cities of some 
g the bias in 
vators and ramps  rather than stairs the 
dominant way of building.  Eliminating the bias in favor of men with stay-at-home wives 
would make flexibility in schedule and working from home the norm, rather than the 9-
to-6 day or 24/7/365 availability.  The idea behind de-biasing was to restructure the 
institution of work and the norms about what constitutes “hard work” and a “good 
worker” so as to include more “different” kinds of people within the social norm of the 
capable worker. Central to this project was the realization that different workers might 
have to be included in the workplace on different terms.  
which – ex
rimination law).  
Rational Discrimination and Accommodation    
 
Though not always explicitly framed in this way, rational discri
accommodation present an after-inclusion problem. Is it rational for an 
refuse to hire people whose productivity, after inclusion, the employer bel
be on par with that of other employees? Although early work assumed that m
discrimination were economically irrational because the employer wou
constrict its pool of talent, scholars have observed that in many circum
economically rational for an employer to discriminate against people 
lacking a certain trait.  Employers might prefer not to hire people with ge
proclivity to illness or injury, or women of childbearing age, or people wi
mental disabilities.  Through a lively debate about which traits ought to 
occupational equality (differential work ethics, for example) and which o
ability to see, hear, or walk, or having children), a number of scholars, pr
area of disability and gender, argued that law should address the proble
discrimination by imposing an affirmative obligation on employers to 
certain traits.  (Bagenstos 2006; Jolls 2001; Fisk 1986) The notion is 
inclusion, the employer redesig
g able to work as productively as another, the ability of each employee
to the employer’s profits is on par with every other employee’s and the cos
conditions will no longer be borne solely by the individuals who have the 
duty to accommodate difference, therefore, can be conceptualized a
preferential treatment after inclusion.   
Accommodation mandates would not only spread some of the cost
from individuals onto society as a whole, they would, proponents hop
stereotypes by forcing employers to see that many prospective employees could 
accomplish much more in a job than the employer might have im
accommodation mandate would thus show in some cases that accommoda
really required at all, except to overcome an employer’s bias about the capa
employees.  Another goal of accommodation was de-biasing.  Eliminatin
favor of able-bodied persons would make ele
5/29/2008 
The concepts of rational discrimination and accommodation are de
controversial with respect to race than with respect to disability and pregn
of scholarship in the 1960s staked out the position that, by and large, ra
irrational.  (Schuman & Harding 1964; Simpson & Yinger 1958). The e
instances in which an employer who herself harbored no racial animus disc
order to accommodate customers’ racist preferences.  More recently, howeve
scholars have struggled to determine whether discrimination that i
generalizations about statistically significant differences between race
condemned as simple stereotyping or should be understood as a kin
disc
cidedly more 
ancy. A wave 
cial bias was 
xception was 
riminated in 
r, courts and 
s based on 
s should be 
d of rational 
 employers to 
 on firms the 
employ. 
lack men and 
based on the 
 middle-aged 
ericans have 
 as between a 
b candidate who graduated from the same college, the white 
can  entering the 
 achievement 
 discriminate 
ployer could 
ck candidate is less qualified that a white 
can s but give the 
this disparate 
otion than the 
 in which the 
 First, should 
nswer is yes, 
ion that anti-
ost of certain 
ggest that the 
n if they are 
ative action, 
mative action 
f course, this 
ent may, for 
example, under-predict job performance of outsiders who do not compete on a level 
playing field in school. That is, a variety of institutional dynamics might negatively affect 
academic achievement of non-white students in predominantly white schools and poor 
resources might negatively affect the academic achievement of non-white students in 
predominantly non-white schools.  Regardless of whether affirmative action beneficiaries 
perform less well than their counterparts, to the extent that that perception exists—and is 
instantiated in law—scholars are going to continue to struggle with whether the language 
rimination. In either case, the question is whether law should compel
revise their judgments about the capable worker, even if it means imposing
cost of hiring a worker who turns out to be more risky or more expensive to 
Consider an employer who knows the incarceration rates of young b
middle-aged white women. The employer might prefer to hire the latter 
conclusion that young black men are far more likely to be criminals than
white women. Similarly, an employer who knows that many African Am
been beneficiaries of affirmative action in education might conclude that,
black and a white jo
didate might have had higher predictors of academic achievement upon
school. (Sander 2006). If the employer believes that predictors of academic
are correlated with job performance, the employer might rationally choose to
against the black candidate.  
This problem could occur after inclusion as well. That is, an em
decide that, because of affirmative action, a bla
didate.  The employer could nevertheless decide to hire both candidate
white candidate more and better work.  Over the course of several years, 
treatment could result in the white candidate being more qualified for prom
black candidate. This “more qualified” status is directly a result of the way
white and black candidates were treated after inclusion.   
The foregoing examples raise at least the following two questions.
they be conceptualized as rational discrimination? Second, assuming the a
how do we think about accommodation? Commitment to a robust not
discrimination law should spread from individuals to firms some of the c
traits (e.g., a greater likelihood of having a prior criminal record) might su
law should compel employers to take a chance on young black men, eve
statistically more likely to have criminal records.  With respect to affirm
some argue that, in effect, it “accommodates” the fact that the affir
beneficiaries might not do as well on the job as the other applicants. O
formulation can be contested.  Traditional measures of academic achievem
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of rational discrimination and its concomitant, accommodation, ought to be
the racial context. If the answer is yes, should accommodation transce
context and operate after inclusion? Some already argue that the line b
discrimination (in the r
 applicable to 
nd the hiring 
etween anti-
ace context) and accommodation (in the disability context) is 
incoherent.  (Bagenstos 2003) 
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mpowered to 
l barometers, 
cial climate of 
d, more particularly, to determine the presence or absence of intentional 
disc e of the first 
n they do the 
e worse than 
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uce a scenario 
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Still another 
 harshly than 
-monitor their 
 discriminate 
a-racial racial 
r otherwise at 
monitor their 
 are racially 
s to shore up 
 are not going 
ployees better 
romote those 
who are most 
ck employees 
bring suit? One line of cases suggests that the answer might be yes; that intra-racial 
discrimination might be cognizable under Title VII.  For example, courts have long 
recognized colorism cases—that is, cases in which a black person discriminates against 
another black based on the fact that that person is too dark or too light. (Banks 2000; 
Jones 2000; Hernandez 2007). But courts also employ the fact that the discrimination 
plaintiff and the institutional decision-maker are of the same race to find an absence of 
discrimination. This creates an incentive for majority-white firms to structure their line of 
Intra-racial Discrimination 
 
As more racial minorities successfully climb the workplace ladder,
part of the decision-making apparatus. They become institutionally e
influence the hiring and firing of other outsiders.  They also become racia
which is to say, their white counterparts will turn to them to ascertain the ra
the workplace an
rimination in the workplace.  (Carbado & Gulati 2004). But what if som
generation of outsiders treat members of their own racial groups worse tha
white employees?      
Consider why black managers might treat junior black employe
junior white employees. Black managers might believe that non-whites ha
burden of working twice as hard as whites; anything less would not dis
racial stereotypes of the group. Alternatively, the senior black employee
internalized negative stereotypes of their own racial group. This could prod
in which, for example, a black manager racially allocates work, preferr
American employee over her black counterpart based on racial stereotypes 
disparity between Asian-American and African-American work ethics. 
reason to think blacks in leadership positions might treat junior blacks more
junior whites relates to self-monitoring; blacks might be less inclined to self
racial interactions with other blacks on the view that they are not likely to
against members of their own racial group. In other words, because intr
discrimination might be unintelligible or unimaginable to black managers o
odds with their sense of racial commitment and community, they do not 
interactions with their junior black colleagues to ascertain whether they
infused.  In addition, black managers might mistreat their black employee
their own standing in the firm or to prove to their white colleagues that they
to engage in racial favoritism. (Carbado & Gulati 2004)  
Apart from the question of whether black managers treat black employees worse 
than white employees is the question of whether they treat some black em
than others. Assume that Paul, a black manager, is more than happy to p
black employees who perform their race in a particular way—that is, those 
conforming in terms of their institutional behavior. Can the disfavored bla
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authority so that it appears that hiring and firing decisions involving non-wh
by non-whites.  Of course, some institutions will have more institution
others to engage in such strategic behavior. The point is that, if a firm is 
disc
ites are made 
al space than 
worried about 
 the intra-race 
ass. At some 
ook like class 
scribed. This 
n and identity 
nds and race 
cause of our 
er picks one 
typically black person (and both are 
phe kin problem), 
ns there is no 
l. Consider a 
raduate of an 
 enjoys playing squash rather than a working class, evangelical 
gra  An argument 
t play at well. 
outside of its 
t 
or one thing, 
rinally, class-
eople believe 
economically 
 advantaged, 
eptual, doctrinal, and 
political difficulties with class makes race as a category around which to organize both 
lega nti-discrimination work all the more important. Scholars will 
therefore continue to think critically and carefully about where to draw the race/class 
line ape how we 
rate treatment 
Much work has documented the myriad ways in which race is socially 
constructed.  (Gross 1998; 2006; Harris 2001; Crenshaw 2005)  The claim that race is a 
social construction is deeply implicated in what we call inclusive exclusion.  The terms 
upon which outsiders are included in the workplace and the ways in which they perform 
their racial identity after inclusion constructs race as well. Consider this point with 
respect to the widely shared belief that diversity is good for business. Sometimes this 
commitment to diversity is so diluted that it comes to mean anything but racial diversity. 
rimination, it can structure things so that the key decisions are made in
context.     
Another difficulty with intra-racial race discrimination cases is cl
point, a black manager’s preference for another black person begins to l
discrimination.  How we dress, speak, and comport ourselves are class in
does not mean that race is not also at play. As with the issues of assimilatio
performance discussed above, it becomes difficult to know where class e
begins. (Malamud 2003).  This problem of class is all the more salient be
tendency to view race as phenotype. To the extent that a black manag
phenotypically black person over another pheno
notypcially black in the same way—i.e., there is not a dark skin/light s
there is no discrimination on the basis of phenotype. For many, that mea
discrimination on the basis of race. (Carbado & Gulati 2003). 
Significantly, this problem exists with respect to whites as wel
scenario in which a white manager hires or promotes a mainline Protestant g
Ivy League college who
duate of a Southern Bible college who enjoys watching Nascar races.
can be made that this is purely class discrimination. But, plausibly, race is a
The very notion of a southern hick or a redneck does not make sense 
historical racial association.    
Much is at stake, doctrinally and politically, with respect to whether an alleged ac
of discrimination is framed as class-based rather than a race-based claim.  F
class is notoriously difficult to define. (Malamud 1995). For another, doct
based discrimination claims are not cognizable.  Finally, because many p
that class identity is fluid, that through hard work and determination the 
disadvantaged can transcend their class identity and become economically
there is little political will to address class inequality. These conc
l and political a
—and so will courts. How we draw this line after inclusion will sh
respond to instances in which outsiders (particular juniors) experience dispa
in the workplace at the hands of other outsiders (particularly seniors).    
 
Racial Endogeneity 
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(Edelman, Fuller, & Mara-Drita 2000).  But when diversity means racial d
firm decides to reduce the real or perceived reputational and econo
maintaining an all-white workplace, the firm’s diversity hiring will have a
effects.  It produces (constructs) particular racial types for the workplace
iversity and a 
mic costs of 
fter inclusion 
. Put another 
way t to diversity 
marker, and it 
e who “look” 
 light-skinned 
ted ideas: (1) 
t that they are 
ng them. This 
luded. Under 
air 
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less al content of 
tionalizes its 
oo, have after 
 that is more 
ed to certain 
c or are more 
e prospective 
rms of social 
tive, she acts 
re otherwise 
rnatively, the 
ference to the extent that difference causes grit 
lty), diverse 
e the grit and 
his approach 
of managing 
os, race is not 
nd therefore 
another way, in the context of hiring, employers make 
dec , how they do 
t example the 
cond example 
does so by focusing on social meaning. These two approaches produce two different 
categories of black people for the workplace. Third, how employers operationalize 
diversity can produce an inclusive exclusion whereby the inclusion of some blacks is 
accomplished by the exclusion of others. 
    Racial endogeneity is not just a function of how employers screen prospective 
employees, it is also a function of how employees define themselves in the workplace 
after inclusion. A person of black and white parentage might define herself as bi-racial, 
, how an employer understands and operationalizes its commitmen
shapes the racial identity of the people within the workplace.  
 If an employer understands race to be nothing more than a physical 
wants a diverse workplace based on skin color, it will employ black peopl
“black.” Under such a scenario, the employer might discriminate against
blacks—blacks who could pass for whites—based on one of two inter-rela
that really light-skinned blacks are simply not black enough and (2) the fac
not black enough means that the firm won’t get any diversity credits for hiri
would not necessarily mean that all light-skinned blacks would be exc
American rules of racial recognition, many fair skinned black people are, based on h
texture and facial fe
 black, their diversity value is reduced. The point is that the raci
employees after inclusion is a direct result of the how the employer opera
commitment to diversity. 
There are other approaches to race an employer could take. These, t
inclusion effects. An employer could, for example, take a view of race
focused on social meaning: black people have rhythm or are more attun
aspects of pop culture or are lazy; white people are less hip or less athleti
industrious. Under this approach, the question is not simply whether th
employee is black in terms of physicality but whether she is black in te
behavior. Crudely, the question is whether, from the employer’s perspec
black.  The employer could believe that people who act black or who a
racially salient are more likely to embody negative racial stereotypes. Alte
employer could worry about the cost of dif
rather than grease (division and distrust rather than teamwork and loya
workplaces are difficult to manage. (Langevoort 2004). One way to reduc
advance diversity is to hire people who look black but act white. T
simultaneously maximizes diversity and reduces the transaction costs 
difference. (Carbado & Gulati 2003; Yoshino 2006) 
Three points about the foregoing bear mention. First, in both scenari
exogenous to the employment process. It is in part constituted in a
endogenous to that process.  Put 
isions about what race is—which is to say, they construct race.  Second
so shapes the identities of the employees after inclusion. While in the firs
employer constructs race by focusing on physicality, the employer in the se
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not black. Perhaps she does so because she fears that a black racial desig
with it the baggage of negative racial stereotypes. Alternatively, she may n
as black because she does not want to be viewed as a beneficiary of affir
Perhaps she feels that her racial identity is determined by whether she was
parent but not another, or by whether her family associated m
nation carries 
ot self-define 
mative action.  
 raised by one 
ore with “black culture” or 
“wh  is a function 
ential problem 
de the racial 
s because bi-
n, white and 
e firm place a 
defer to the 
black—to the 
tion implications—doctrinally and normatively—
of a firm doing this?  And does the answer to that question change if affirmative action 
le in the original hire (where, presumably, the employee in question was not 
con
iscrimination 
doctrinal, and 
empirical growth.  In an area of law that over its first several decades was prone to 
reasing racial 
andonment of 
ade might be 
ng, revealing, 
ategory and a 
holarship has 
clare whether 
 Specifically, 
 of minorities 
ce and gender 
n judging in the anti-discrimination context. (cf. Boyd et al. 2007, Peresie 2005). 
The nature and meaning of race remain in flux in society and in law and social science 
scholarship. In studying this, legal scholarship has participated in a transformation of our 
ding of the role of race in society and of the nature and sources of racial 
inequality, even as courts have all but given up on doing anything about it. Indeed, the 
general hostility (and occasional sympathy) of courts to anti-discrimination cases might 
itself provide the next generation of discrimination scholars with fascinating material for 
study.   
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